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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The advent of recreational trails throughout the country has al-
lowed thousands of citizens the opportunity to casually bike, hike, jog,
walk, and in some cases rollerblade along miles of urban waterfront or
through the pastoral rural countryside. The light clicks of shifting de-
railleurs or muffled taps of air-soled shoes, however, mask one of the
country's most contentious property issues over the past 30 years.'
The dispute has been over preserving unused railroad corridors by
converting them into public recreational trails or pathways.2  In
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1. See generally Danaya C. Wright, Private Rights and Public Ways: Property Disputes and
Rails-To-Trail In Indiana, 30 IND. L. REV. 723, 724 (1997).
2. Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000), reads:
The Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, and the Secretary of the Interior, in administering the Railroad Revitalization
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (45 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), shall encourage State and
local agencies and private interests to establish appropriate trails using the provisions
of such programs. Consistent with the purposes of that Act, and in furtherance of the
national policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of
rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient
transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way
pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent with
this chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad
purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law,
as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. If a State,
political subdivision, or qualified private organization is prepared to assume full re-
sponsibility for management of such rights-of-way and for any legal liability arising
out of such transfer or use, and for the payment of any and all taxes that may be levied
or assessed against such rights-of-way, then the Commission shall impose such terms
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Washington State alone, the prospect of new recreational trails has led
to ongoing litigation and news headlines around the Seattle-Puget
Sound area. Landowners adjacent to a proposed trail through farm-
land in Skagit County, north of Seattle, have filed federal and state
class action suits hoping to stop trail construction.3 Rural residents
east of Tacoma in Pierce County have filed suit to halt development of
one trail and have organized to oppose the trail's extension. 4 Home-
owners along the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish outside of Seattle
have filed multiple state and federal suits, challenging King County's
land acquisition process and regulatory compliance.' Suburban city
residents in Kirkland have threatened litigation upon the City Coun-
cil's voting to study the possibility of a trail.6
Hiking and biking trails are extremely popular with citizens in
both rural and urban settings.7 According to the Rails-to-Trails Con-
servancy, there are currently 1,109 recreational trails stretching 11,313
miles across the country.8 The organization reports that another 1,225
trails totaling an additional 17,131 miles have been proposed through-
out the nation.' The country's two most heavily used trails attract an
estimated two million users annually." Hiking and biking trails pro-
vide dedicated pathways for public recreational activity and alternative
forms of transportation for daily commuters. Furthermore, trails pro-
vide needed public open space in areas with limited available recrea-
tional land.
In 1983, Congress amended the National Trails System Act of
1968," recognizing the value of public rail corridors. The 1983
Amendment was intended to promote the preservation of abandoned
and conditions as a requirement of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a
manner consistent with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonment or discon-
tinuance inconsistent or disruptive of such use.
3. See, e.g., Good v. Skagit, 104 Wash. App. 670, 17 P.3d 1216 (2001).
4. Rob Tucker, Farmers: Extended Trail Will Trample Operations; Foothills Trail: Growers
Launch Campaign To Stop Plan In Its Tracks, NEws TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 2000.
5. Tim Larson, Trail Fight Goes To Court Today: Contractor Alleges County Forced Him To
Put Down Gravel, EASTSIDE J., Dec. 12, 2000, available at http://www.eastsidejournal.com/
sited/story/html/36506.
6. Peyton Whitely, Kirkland To Study Trail Proposal Despite Threat of Suit, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis/
web/vortex/display?slug=tral&date=19990317.
7. RAILS-TO-TRAILS CONSERVANCY, RAIL-TRAIL MILEAGE (June 2001), available at
http://www.railtrails.org/RTC-Documents/Reports/15.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. RAILS-TO-TRAILS CONSERVANCY, RAIL-TRAIL MILEAGE (Oct. 2000) (stating that
the two most popular trails in the country are the Minuteman Bikeway in Massachusetts and
W&OD Railroad Trail in Virginia) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-51 (2000).
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railroad rights of way for potential future railroad use. 12 The Act au-
thorizes private or public entities to purchase inactive or unused rail
lines from railroad companies for conversion into public recreational
use.'3 Railroads retain the option to repurchase the trail and reinstall
tracks should rail operations become once again necessary through the
corridor. 4 Abandonment of the right of way is thus postponed and
"banked" with a state, municipality, or private organization responsi-
ble for the trail.'" Railroads are relieved of tort liability and property
tax payments of between $18,000 and $24,000 per mile per year within
the corridor.' 6 Local residents enjoy a recreational pathway isolated
from automobile traffic,' 7 and public transportation corridors are pre-
served for a variety of alternative public purposes including highways,
utility corridors, wildlife habitat, and recreational trails.'"
Landowners adjacent to railbanked corridors, however, claim
converting railroad corridors into recreational trails constitutes an un-
constitutional taking, requiring compensation under the Fifth
Amendment, 9 Homeowners living next to proposed recreational
trails have also argued trails lead to increased crime and public safety
12. Oversight Hearing on Agency Administration of the Rails-to-Trails Act: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Railroads of the House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, 104th
Cong. (1996) (on file with Seattle University Law Review) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 79A.35.080 (2001) reads:
All trails designated as state recreational trails will be constructed, maintained, and
operated to provide for one or more of the following general types of use: Foot, foot
powered bicycle, horse, motor vehicular or watercraft travel as appropriate to the ter-
rain and location, or to legal, administrative or other necessary restraints. It is further
provided that the same trail shall not be designated for use by foot and vehicular
travel at the same time.
14. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(2) (1999).
15. Oversight Hearing, supra note 12.
16. Id.; see also Steven R. Wild, A History of Railroad Abandonments, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 2
(1995) (citing Henry B. McFarland, Railroad Abandonment Policy in the 1990's, 58 TRANSP.
PRAC. J. 331, 336 (1991) (figures in 1989 dollars)). But see Jeffrey Alan Bandini, The Acquisition,
Abandonment, and Preservation of Rail Corridors in North Carolina: A Historical Review and Con-
temporary Analysis, 75 N.C. L. REV 1989, 1990 n.5 (1997) (Memorandum from Jeff Bandini,
Rail Division, North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) to Grayson Kelley,
Deputy Attorney General, Transportation Section, North Carolina Department of Justice
(NCDOJ) (June 12, 1996) (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT) (noting that property taxation is
a very minor factor in railroads' abandonment decisions in North Carolina)).
17. RAILS-TO TRAILS CONSERVANCY, supra note 7.
18. Charles H. Montange, Fixing the Unbroken in the Federal Railbanking and Trial Use
Statute: A Rejoinder to "Unhappy Trails", 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 53, 57 (1990); see also 49
U.S.C. § 10906 (1988); Judy Mills, Clearing The Path For All Of Us Where Trains Once Ran,
SMITHSONIAN, Apr. 1990, at 132 (describing advantages of linear parks from rail corridors);
Charles H. Montange, NEPA in an Era of Economic Deregulation: A Case Study of Environmental
Avoidance at the Interstate Commerce Commission, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 16-17 & nn.85-87
(1989).
19. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Preseault III).
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problems from trail users in the immediate area, 20 additional trespass-
ing,2' loss of privacy,22 and to diminished property values because of
the public use.23 Trail critics generally substantiate their claims with
little more than anecdotal evidence, but the prospect of adverse im-
pacts has prompted significant litigation over an otherwise popular
public amenity.
Landowners adjacent to railbanked corridors have challenged,
among other things, administrative rail abandonment procedures, 24 the
constitutionality of the 1983 Amendment,2 5 and the conversion of rail
right of way to recreational use.26 More recently, adjacent landowners
and property rights advocates have sought compensation for perceived
property loss through class action litigation 27 and legislative changes to
the National Trail System Act.2" They have even tried collateral chal-
lenges, seeking state relief from the federal regulation.29
Railbanking opponents have become creative in attempting to
stop proposed trails. One homeowners group has attempted to cir-
cumvent the Act by establishing a fictitious railroad within the unused
rail corridor in order to maintain the rail bed for active rail use.30 A
husband and wife have tried a self-help route, erecting barbed wire
20. Peyton Whitely, Study Shows Benefits Of Proposed Kirkland Trail, SEATTLE TIMES,
Oct. 20, 1998, available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis/web/vortex
/display?slug=kirk&date=l 9981020.
21. KING COUNTY PARK SYS. & DEP'T. OF CONSTRUCTION AND FACILITIES MGMT.,
DRAFT REPORT, EAST LAKE SAMMAMISH INTERIM USE AND RESOURCE PROTECTION
PLAN, App. D (July 1999).
22. Id.
23. Dick Welsh, The National Association of Reversionary Property Owners (NARPO), The
Burke-Gilman Trail and Property Values, Explanation of Accompanying Spreadsheet On Certain
Property Values (Apr. 16, 1998), available at http://www.halcyon.com/dick/bg-study.doc.
24. Nat'l Ass'n of Reversionary Prop. Owners v. Surface Transp. Bd., 158 F.3d 135, 143
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that individual notice to property owners is not required prior to
abandonment).
25. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (Preseault II) (holding that even if the statute
gives rise to a taking, compensation is available through the Tucker Act, which satisfies the Fifth
Amendment requirements).
26. Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 545, 598 (1998) (holding that im-
pacts to adjacent land from a rail line converted to a hiker/biker path cannot be compensated).
27. Moore v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 394, 400 (1998) (granting a class action on an opt-
in basis).
28. See Emily Drumm, Addressing The Flaws Of The Rails-To-Trails Act, 8 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 158, 167 (1999).
29. 16 U.S.C. 1247(d) (2000).
30. Redmond-Issaquah R.R. Preservation Ass'n. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 223 F.3d 1057,
1061-62 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting attempt by homeowners opposing recreational trail to create
their own railroad in rail corridor).
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topped chain linked fences across the inactive rail bed, hoping to stop
trail construction.31
The litigation has led to additional costs for taxpayers and delays
in trail construction. Furthermore, settlements and court decisions
can lead to unjust windfalls for property owners falsely claiming prop-
erty interests in the rail corridor.32
This Comment will analyze the recent approach the Washington
court has incorporated in settling trail development disputes across the
State. In particular, the Comment will examine the court's use of
common law deed interpretation principles in upholding property
rights while preserving valuable public transportation corridors. Fur-
thermore, the Comment will show how the Washington court's recent
approach in interpreting railroad deeds has made recreational trail
construction more appropriately a legislative matter, rather than a le-
gal one.
Section I of the Comment will begin with an historical overview
of railroads in the United States, background on the public "Rails-to-
Trails" movement, and an explanation of the underlying public policy
and enabling federal law. Section II will then examine the leading fed-
eral case on railbanking. Section III will look at how Washington
courts have addressed the railroad corridor preservation issue, particu-
larly the Washington Supreme Court's reasoning pertaining to deed
interpretation in Brown v. State.33 Section IV will address how the
court has handled rail corridor quiet title actions subsequent to Brown.
Finally, Section V will conclude with observations for future trail con-
struction within Washington State.
I. HISTORY OF RAILS-TO-TRAILS
A. The Rise of Railroads in the United States
The advent of rail travel fueled industrial growth in the United
States during the 1800's. The amount of the country's railroad tracks
grew from about 100 miles to over 27,000 miles between 1830 and
1860."4 Congress facilitated the rapid rail expansion by invoking its
31. Peyton Whitely, Fences Blocking Proposed Sammamish Trail, SEATTLE TIMES, May 16,
1997, available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis/web/vortex/display?
slug=tral&date=19970516.
32. Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails,
Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-
First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 354 n. 8 (2000).
33. 130 Wash. 2d 430, 924 P.2d 908 (1996).
34. Drumm, supra note 28, at 159 n.ll (citing 2 JACKSON J. SPIEL VOGEL, WESTERN
CIVILIZATION 718 (2d ed. 1994)).
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eminent domain power in acquiring land needed to support the na-
tional infrastructure.3" In addition, federal lawmakers embarked on a
policy of providing railroads with lavish public land grants.36 The
federal government in 1835 began granting an estimated ninety mil-
lion acres of land directly to railroads and another forty million acres
indirectly to rail carriers through various state grants.37 By 1890, Con-
gress had transferred more than 1.2 billion acres of public land to
private parties.38 Many states also passed laws giving railroads plenary
powers to condemn and acquire private land for railroad uses.39 Ac-
quiring property for railroads, however, was hardly an exact practice.
Some railroad companies armed with quasi-governmental power
established corridors based on convenience and economy, rather than
on pre-existing property boundaries.4" Railroad representatives would
appear on landowner's doorsteps with form deeds in hand.41 Land-
owners could either sell their property or have it taken under eminent
domain.4 2 The process led to ambiguous conveyances sometimes stat-
ing fee simple acquisitions but using terms such as rights of way,
easements, reversions, and other limiting language such as "for rail-
road purposes only."43
Congress acted to define the scope of railroad property interests
by enacting the Transportation Act of 1920. 44 The Act granted the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the authority to regulate
construction, operation, and abandonment of railroad lines.45 At the
time of the Act's passage, U.S. railroads had laid down more than a
quarter of a million miles of tracks.46
35. Id. at 159 n.13 (citing G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW 106 (2d ed. 1987)).
36. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 273 (1942).
37. Karin P. Sheldon, Federal Lands in the West Embarking on the New Millennium, The
Thrilling Days of Yesteryear: Some Comments on the Settlement of the West and the Development of
Federal Land and Resource Law, SF34 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 12 (2000) (citing PAUL W. GATES,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 1-48, 356-86 (1968)).
38. Id. (citing E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSITION
AND RESERVATION POLICIES 1900-1950 8 (1951)).





44. Law of 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 474, 477-78 (1920) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 10903 (1998)).
45. The ICC was dissolved in 1996, and the agency's duties transferred to the Department
of Transportation's Surface Transportation Board. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-88, §§ 101-102, 109 Stat. 803, 804-52 (1995).
46. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990) (Preseault II).
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Ten years later, however, railroads began facing stiff competition
from the country's trucking industry.47 The federal government was
directly subsidizing the nation's highways.4" Truckers, having no
need to own roads or pay property taxes, enjoyed lower costs.49 Until
the 1920's, railroads had a virtual monopoly on the nation's freight
revenue. 0 In the early 1930's, rail companies began consolidating and
abandoning lines in order to remain profitable, as U.S. industry dis-
covered other modes of freight transport." By 1940, rail carriers'
freight revenue market share dropped to 75.42 percent, while motor
carriers captured 17.74 percent.5 2
B. The Subsequent Fall
By the 1960's, railroads had been in full retreat for thirty years,
and the country had sustained substantial loses in its rail network
through abandonments and property reversions. As of 1963, rail car-
riers had abandoned 49,374 miles of the 252,588 miles of track that
existed in 1920." In 1970, rail freight revenue market share dropped
to 40.62 percent and was still falling. 4 Meanwhile, motor carriers
captured 53.26 percent of market share. 5
Congress, in recognizing the expense of reacquiring the rail cor-
ridors for possible future use, addressed the issue by enacting the Rail-
road Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act of 1976.6 The
4R Act expressly prescribed the preservation of abandoned rail corri-
dors for public use, including "highways, other forms of mass trans-
portation, conservation, energy production or transmission, or recrea-
tion. '5 7  The Act authorized the ICC to delay abandonment
47. See Wright, supra note 1, at 726 n. 18 (citing Dennis McKinney, A Railroad Ran
Through It, in INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, STAYING ON THE
CUTTING EDGE: THIRD ANNUAL REAL ESTATE SYMPOSIUM (1995)); Samuel H. Morgan,
Rails-To-Trails: On the Right Track, 8 PROB. & PROP. 10, (1994); Wild, supra note 16.
48. Wild, supra note 16, at 6 (citing RICHARD D. STONE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION AND THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY, 34-35 (1991)).
49. Id. (citing STONE, supra note 48, at 69, as stating that railroads had little local political
support in tax districting arrangements and often paid discriminatory rates).
50. Id. at 7 (citing MICHAEL CONANT, RAILROAD MERGERS AND ABANDONMENTS,
113 (1964)).
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 7 (citing AM. TRUCKING ASs'NS, AMERICAN TRUCKING TRENDS 1979-1980 35
(1980) [hereinafter AMERICAN TRUCKING TRENDS]).
53. Id. at 5 (citing CONANT, supra note 50 (using ICC statistics)).
54. AMERICAN TRUCKING TRENDS, supra note 52, at 35.
55. Id. (stating that airways captured 2.61 percent and oil pipelines captured 2.17 percent
of freight revenue market share).
56. Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 802, 90 Stat. 31, 127-30 (1976) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 10905 (1998)).
57. Id.
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proceedings until after a public use offer had been refused. 8 The in-
tent of the 4R Act was to promote what is now known as "railbank-
ing," the preservation of abandoned rail corridors for potential future
rail use. 9
Applying the 4R Act in preserving abandoned rail corridors,
however, proved cumbersome and unwieldy. Railroad companies
looking to quickly dispose of financial responsibilities along an unused
or underused corridor had no incentive to work with trail groups or lo-
cal municipalities in fashioning a land transfer.60
In 1983, Congress recognized that its previous efforts were not
successful in establishing a process utilizing unused railroad right of
ways for recreational trail purposes.61 It amended the National Trails
Systems Act by adding Section 8(d).62 The changes allowed the ICC
to withhold abandonment declarations and issue Certificates of In-
terim Trail Use (CITU).6 3 Congress, in amending the Act, expressly
intended that "interim use of a railroad right of way for trail use, when
the route itself remains intact for future railroad purposes, shall not
constitute an abandonment of such rights-of-way for railroad pur-
poses. ""
By 1989, the number of the country's railroad corridor miles had
dropped to about 141,000 miles, a nearly fifty percent reduction from
the railroad industry's peak in 1920.65 Studies suggest that railroad
operators will abandon an additional 3,000 miles of track annually.66
On the other side of the equation, approximately 11,000 miles of rec-
reational trails have now been created under the Act, indicating public
popularity and support of the Act.67
C. Abandoning a Rail Corridor
The presumption underlying railbanking statutes is that a rail-
road has not abandoned tracks under its control, unless the requisite
58. Id.
59. Oversight Hearing, supra note 12.
60. Wright, supra note 1, at 727 n. 21 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10907(b)(1) (Supp. I 1995))
("The ICC could only force a sale to an entity planning to continue offering rail services. It
could not force a sale for trail conversion.").
61. H.R. REP. NO. 98-28, pt. 1, at 119 (1983).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988).
63. Wright, supra note 1, at 727 n.22 (citing Pub. L. No. 98-11, §§ 201-207, 97 Stat. 42,
42-50 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-51 (1994 & Supp. 11995)).
64. H.R. REP. NO, 98-28, pt. 1, at 119 (1983).
65. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990) (Preseault II); see also Thomas A. Jones, Rails to
Trails: Converting America's Abandoned Railroads Into Nature Trails, 22 AKRON L. REV. 645
(1989).
66. Id.
67. RAILS-TO-TRAIL CONSERVANCY, supra note 7.
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administrative criteria (as noted below) have been satisfied.6 The pre-
sumption holds regardless of whether the railroad has already ceased
operations within the rail corridor and has removed tracks, rail ballast,
and other material required for railroad operations.69
A railroad or a successor in interest must apply to the Surface
Transportation Board (STB), formerly the ICC,7 ° for a CITU or
Abandonment.7 Depending on the circumstances, a railroad can al-
ternately file a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) or Abandon-
ment." The CITU or the NITU provides a 180-day period during
which the railroad may discontinue service, cancel tariffs, and salvage
track and equipment.73 The provisions also allow railroads to negoti-
ate a voluntary agreement for interim trail use with a qualified trail
operator.74 If an agreement is reached, interim trail use is subse-
quently authorized under the statute, and the right of way is rail-
banked for future rail service.75 If no agreement is reached within the
time prescribed by the CITU or NITU, the railroad is free to abandon
the right of way and the STB loses jurisdiction over the issue.76 Any
agreement between the railroad and a trail provider must allow the
STB to reopen rail service within the corridor once the STB or a rail
carrier shows a justification for resuming rail service. Federal pre-
emption is lost upon the STB's losing jurisdiction, and property rights
impacted by rail abandonment are, thus, defined under state law.78
II. FROM RAIL TO TRAIL: PRESERVING THE PUBLIC CORRIDOR
A. The Presault Cases
The primary issue involved with converting a rail corridor into a
recreational trail is whether the change in use constitutes a taking un-
68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988); see also Preseault II, 494 U.S. at 7 n.5.
69. Id.
70. Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803, (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (1996)). Before 1995,
discontinuance and abandonment of railway service were the responsibility of the ICC. 49
U.S.C. § 10501(c)(3)(B).
71. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29 (1999); see also Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771,
773 (2000).
72. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1).
73. Id.
74. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(c)(1).
75. Glosemeyer, 45 Fed. Cl. at 774.
76. Id.; see also Robin W. Foster, RTLD Railway Corporation v. Surface Transportation
Board: Jurisdictional Derailment-Has the Sixth Circuit Thrown the Switch on the Congressional
Policy of Promoting "Railbanking," The Conversion of Railroad Tracks into Recreational Hiking
and Biking Trails?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 601, 610 (2000).
77. Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 37 Fed. CI. 545, 554 (1998).
78. Oversight Hearing, supra note 12.
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der the Fifth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court in re-
viewing cases involving the railbanking statute has recognized the ple-
nary power of the ICC (now STB) over railroad abandonments. How-
ever, the Court has expressly looked to state law in deciding whether
application of the statute has led to an unconstitutional taking.
The Court, in its most significant decision on the issue, Presault
v. ICC (Presault II), upheld the use of rail corridors for recreational
trails, noting Congress's valid use of the Commerce Clause to preserve
railroad right of ways for future rail use and to encourage energy-
efficient transportation alternatives.79 Presault is actually a series of
cases filed by J. Paul and Patricia Presault in various courts against
both the federal government and State of Vermont. The cases in-
volved three lots referred to as Parcels A, B, and C along Vermont's
Lake Champlain.8" The Rutland-Canadian Railroad Company ac-
quired a right of way through the parcels in 1899.81 Railroad owner-
ship subsequently passed through several hands.8 2 Active railroad op-
erations eventually ceased in 1970.83 Vermont removed the tracks on
the Presaults' property in 1975, although tracks remained on land ad-
jacent to the parcels at issue.84 The state also continued to collect rent
on pre-existing license and crossing agreements. 8 In 1982, the Ver-
mont Legislature passed a statute maintaining possession of railroad
easements notwithstanding cessation of railroad operations.86 The leg-
islature also applied the statute's provisions retroactively. 7
The Presault II Court noted that Congress intended to deem in-
terim trail use as "discontinuance," rather than an "abandonment" of
the rail corridor, to prevent reversion under state law. 8 The Court
further held that state law generally governs the disposition of rever-
sionary interests subject to the ICC's "exclusive and plenary" jurisdic-
tion to regulate rail abandonments.8 9 If the statute preempts a prop-
erty owner's reversionary interest in the rail bed, the Court held, the
Tucker Act would provide a remedy for any taking of the reversionary
79. 494 U.S. 1, 8 (1990).
80. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Preseault III).
81. Id.
82. Id.










interest or claim of inverse condemnation.9" The Tucker Act grants
the United States Court of Claims jurisdiction over "any claim against
the Federal Government to recover damages founded on the Constitu-
tion, a statute, a regulation, or an express or implied-in-fact con-
tract. '"91
The Court's holding reaffirmed the notion state law largely de-
termines a property owner's reversionary interests. Justice O'Connor
noted in her concurrence that when determining whether a taking has
occurred under the railbanking statute, "[the Court is] mindful of the
basic axiom that [p]roperty interests ... are not created by the Consti-
tution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understanding that stem from an independent source
such as state law." 92
Following the Court's holding in Presault II, the case was re-
manded to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (Presault III) to de-
termine whether a taking had occurred. The Federal Circuit sitting en
banc concluded that a taking had occurred. The court focused, in
part, on whether the original railroad deeds to Parcels A, B, and C
conveyed an easement or a fee interest to the railroad.93 If the railroad
obtained a fee simple interest and conveyed such an interest to its suc-
cessors, the Presaults would have no takings claim.94 On the other
hand, if the railroad had acquired easements, and if such easements
did not include use as a public recreational trail, the Presaults could
have a takings claim for loss of a reversionary interest.9 5
The Federal Circuit concluded, among other things, the rail cor-
ridor through Parcels A, B, and C were acquired as easements. 96 The
court held that Vermont law empowered the railroad company to ac-
quire only "such real and personal estate as is necessary in the judg-
ment of such corporation, for the construction, maintenance and ac-
commodation of such railroad." 97  Thus, regardless of the
documentation and manner of acquisition, a railroad in Vermont could
generally acquire only an easement when acquiring land for tracks and
operating equipment.98
90, Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (Preseault II).
91. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)(1982)).
92. Id. at 20; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
93. Preseault III, 100 F.3d at 1534.
94. Id. at 1533.
95, Id.
96. Id. at 1535.
97. Id. at 1534-35.
98. Id. at 1535.
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The court's conclusion was particularly significant with regard to
Parcel C.99 The deed to Parcel C purported to convey to the railroad
the described strip "[tlo have and to hold the above granted and bar-
gained premises . . . unto it the said grantee, its successors and assigns,
forever, to its and their own proper use, benefit, and behoof for-
ever."' 0  The deed further warranted that grantors have "a good,
indefeasible estate, in fee simple, and have good right to bargain and
sell the same in manner and form as above written.'' °. Unlike Parcels
A and B, which were acquired arguably through eminent domain pro-
ceedings,0 2 the government argued, the Parcel C deed on its face con-
veyed fee simple title.' Nevertheless, the court concluded Vermont
state law allowed railroads to "take only so much land or estate therein
as is necessary for their public purpose ... whether the price is fixed
by the commissioners or by the parties."'0 4  Thus, the conclusions
reached in Presault III with regard, among other things, to deed inter-
pretation would play a large role in future attempts to preserve rail-
road corridors throughout the nation.
B. Washington State Law
The Washington Legislature has expressly stated that railroad
properties are dedicated for public use, such as utility facilities, trans-
portation, and recreational corridors once railroads cease operations
within the right of way.' The State's lawmakers included ICC rail-
banked corridors in their definition of railroad properties, 10 6 thus rec-
ognizing Congressional intent to preserve unused rail corridors as a
matter of federal public policy. The Washington lawmakers also ac-
knowledged rail corridors as public infrastructure.
However, the lawmakers wrote nothing under the Washington
statutes to authorize a public agency to acquire a reversionary interest
in a rail corridor without paying just compensation. 0 7 Thus, while the
lawmakers allowed for the federal railbanking statute to preempt law-
ful abandonment of a rail corridor, they did not intend the statute to
preempt reversionary property interests and compensation.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 1534 (noting that rail right of way through parcel was acquired through a
"Commissioner Award").
103. Id. at 1536.
104. Id.
105. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.04.180 (2000).
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.04.190 (2000).
107. WAsH. REV. CODE § 64.04.180.
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III. APPLYING WASHINGTON STATE LAW: THE IMPORTANCE OF
DEED INTERPRETATION
A. Acquisition of Easements
Rail corridors conveyed as easements and subsequently con-
verted into recreational trails would generally amount to de facto
abandonment and reversion under Washington's law. The Washing-
ton court has applied common law principles, looking to the intent of
the conveyance at the time of the transaction, to determine whether a
deed conveyed an easement, fee simple interest, or something else.
Lawson v. Statelo' involved a 4.8-mile rail corridor between the
cities of Kenmore and Woodinville, located northeast of Seattle. 10 9
King County sought to acquire the rail corridor for a recreational trail
linking two existing trails. In January of 1985, the county requested
the ICC to impose a public use condition upon abandonment pursu-
ant to then existing federal rail abandonment statutes."' The ICC au-
thorized abandonment subject to the then 120-day public use condi-
tion. Under the condition, the railroad could not dispose of the right
of way for 120 days unless it first offered the corridor for public use on
reasonable terms."' The plaintiffs subsequently filed their action,
claiming that the underlying state statutes allowed an unlawful taking
of their reversionary interests without compensation." 2  The trial
court granted King County's motion to dismiss, concluding "a right of
way granted to a railroad is a perpetual public easement; abandonment
of a railroad right of way does not occur upon a change in use from
railroad purposes to some other form of public transportation.""' In
so ruling, the trial court avoided making a factual determination as to
the intent of the original conveyance.
The Washington State Supreme Court accepted direct review of
the Lawson case." 4 The defendant King County made the following
three arguments upon review: (1) the statutes merely embodied com-
mon law; (2) the plaintiffs' reversionary interests were not eliminated
by the statutes, as plaintiffs could still obtain possession of the land
108. 107 Wash. 2d 444, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986).
109. Id. at 446, 730 P.2d at 1310.
110. Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (1988); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.28 (2001) (taking effect after
the Rails-to-Trails Act was signed into law).
111. Lawson, 107 Wash. 2d at 446, 730 P.2d at 1310.
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once it was free from public use; and (3) the plaintiffs had no vested
rights in the corridor, thereby allowing retroactive legislation.11
The court rejected all three arguments and reversed the dis-
missal. First, the court held that the statutes expressly prevent the
ripening of the plaintiffs' reversionary interests upon cessation of rail-
road use and, therefore, do not embody common law.'16 Second, the
court concluded, without the statutes, reversionary interest holders
would possess the easements in question upon rail abandonment."7
Reversionary interest holders would not obtain a possessory interest
under the statutes.118 Finally, the court held that while the legislature
could enact a retroactive statute, the lawmaking body could not inter-
fere with a vested right." 9 While the court noted that certain remote
and speculative future interests were not entitled to constitutional pro-
tection,120 the court concluded reversionary interests were not of such a
type.'12
However, the Lawson court concluded the deeds in question con-
veyed easements for rail purposes only and not perpetual public ease-
ments, even though the trial court never made such a factual determi-
nation. 122 The court rejected the argument that the proposed changes
from a railroad corridor to a recreational trail were consistent with the
grantor's original intent. The court held that the meaning of a grant
will be inferred, absent express language that the grantee is not re-
stricted to the methods used at the time the grant was conveyed.2 1
The court held that under common law, a deed conveying a right of
way for railroad purposes constituted an easement providing the servi-
ent estate with a reversionary interest. 124 Furthermore, the court ap-
plied the common law principle: when the particular use of an ease-
ment for which the easement was established ceases, the land is
discharged and reverts to the original landowner or to the landowner's
successor in interest. 2  The court entertained the notion that a grant
for railway use without express limiting language could accommodate




119. 107 Wash. 2d at 454-55, 730 P.2d at 1314 (citing Gillis v. King County, 42 Wash. 2d
373, 376, 255 P.2d 546, 548 (1953)).
120. Id. at 456, 730 P.2d at 1315; see also Cavett v. Peterson, 688 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1984).
121. Lawson, 107 Wash.2d at 456, 730 P.2d at 1315.
122. Id. at 449, 730 P.2d at 1311 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 450, 730 P.2d at 1312.
124. Id. (citing Roeder Co. v. Burlington N. Inc., 105 Wash. 2d 567, 571, 716 P.2d 855,
859 (1986); Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wash. 2d 533, 225 P.2d 199 (1950); Morsbach v. Thurston




other uses in place at the time of the grant. 126 The court, however, ex-
pressly rejected use of the rail corridor as a recreational trail as consis-
tent with the public travel purpose of the original easement. 127
The Lawson court, in reaching its conclusions, however, did not
make clear whether the deeds in question in fact conveyed property for
rail purposes only. While the court concluded the conveyance in
question constituted an easement exclusively for railroad purposes,
Justice Pearson's concurrence and dissent in the case cast doubt upon
the court's finding. Justice Pearson noted that the deeds did not men-
tion "railroad purposes," but instead spoke to "benefits and advan-
tages" accruing to the grantors.'28 He concluded the deed's language
was unclear as to what "benefits and advantages" were evident at the
time of the conveyance." 9 Under Washington's law, when extrinsic
evidence is considered, the interpretation of the conveyance becomes a
mixed question of fact and law; the question of intent, however, is a
factual one.13° Justice Pearson wrote the "benefits and advantages"
were ambiguous on the face of the conveying instrument.131 Thus,
identifying the "benefits and advantages" and deciding whether they
could reasonably ensue from the use of the easement as a recreational
trail was a factual question not decided at trial. 32
In his dissent, Justice Utter observed that Washington law rec-
ognized that changes in the use of an easement do not necessarily take
the easement beyond its originally intended scope.' 33 Parties to an
easement, he wrote, are presumed to have considered "a normal devel-
opment under conditions which may be different from those existing
at the time of the grant." '134 Under state law, the court considers"normal development" based on "the parties' intentions at the original
creation of the easement, the nature and situation of the servient es-
tates, and the history of the easement's use."' 35
126. Id.
127. 107 Wash. 2d at 451, 730 P.2d at 1312; see also State v. Dept. of Natural Res., 329
N.W. 2d 543 (Minn.) (holding that abandonment does not occur upon change from railroad use
to recreational trail use), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983).
128. Lawson, 107 Wash. 2d at 462, 730 P.2d at 1318 (Pearson, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
129. Id.




133. Id. at 465, 730 P.2d at 1319 (Utter, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (quoting Logan v. Brodrick, 29 Wash. App. 796, 800, 631 P.2d 429, 432 (1981)).
135. Id. at 465, 730 P.2d at 1320 (Utter, J., dissenting) (quoting Logan, 29 Wash. App. at
799, 631 P.2d at 431) (citing Evich v. Kovacevich, 33 Wash. 2d 151, 157, 204 P.2d 839, 842
(1949)).
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Thus, both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lawson are
significant, as the court did not factually determine the intent of the
original conveyance. Nevertheless, the Lawson majority held that al-
ternate public uses of railroad easements would constitute a taking of a
reversionary interest when the deeds in question specifically conveyed
an easement solely for rail use. Given the history of how railroads
originally acquired rail corridors and the court's struggle to determine
the title conveyed and the intent of the parties, it is arguable the court
was too hasty in reaching its conclusion.
B. Fee Simple Acquisition
Ten years later, the Washington court revisited the rail corridors
issue and set the stage for a significantly different analysis in resolving
the rail corridor deed interpretation issue. Brown v. State involved ti-
tle disputes over properties used as a railway in Adams, Kittitas, and
Whitman counties located in Central and Eastern Washington. 136
The disputes were between property owners, who were residing adja-
cent to the rail corridor claiming reversionary interests in the right of
way, and the State of Washington, which had purchased the properties
for development of a recreational trail.'37 The State claimed it had ac-
quired fee simple title based on the original interests expressed on the
Warranty Deed conveyed by the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pa-
cific Railroad Company, which had operated within the corridor.138
Adjacent landowners claimed the original deeds conveyed only right
of way easements. "
The court stated, "[I]n addition to the language of the deed, we
will look at the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and
the subsequent conduct of the parties."'4 ° In making this statement,
the court noted its holding and analysis three years earlier in Harris v.
Ski Park Farms.' Harris involved a deed containing an ambiguous
rail corridor conveyance.' 42 Similar to Brown, the issue was whether
the deed intended to reserve a fee interest or an easement for the prop-
erty owner.4 3  The Harris court held that deed interpretation is a
136. 130 Wash. 2d 430, 433, 924 P.2d 908, 909 (1996).
137. Id. at 436, 924 P.2d at 911.
138. Id. at 433, 924 P.2d at 910.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 438, 924 P.2d at 912; see also Scott v. Wallitner, 49 Wash. 2d 161,162, 299 P.2d
204, 204-05 (1956); Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc., 120 Wash. 2d 727, 739, 844 P.2d 1006, 1012
(1993).
141. 120 Wash. 2d 727, 844 P.2d 1006 (1993)




mixed question of fact and law, consistent with Justice Pearson's con-
currence and dissent in Lawson.14 The Harris court wrote, "[I]t is a
factual question to determine the intent of the parties. Then we must
apply the rules of the law to determine the legal consequences of that
intent. ' 14' The Harris court further noted the common law principle:
a deed should be construed in a manner that gives effect to the intent
of the parties.'46 Additionally, the court derives the intent of the par-
ties from the entire conveying instrument. 147 If an ambiguity exists,
the court will consider the situation and circumstances of the parties at
the time of the grant. 41
The deed in Brown granted the railroad and its successors "a fee
simple title to said strip of land, together with all rights, privileges and
immunities that might be acquired by the exercise of the right of emi-
nent domain."'49 Following the rules established in Harris, the court
conducted a seven-factor test to determine what interest the deed ul-
timately conveyed to the grantee.' The court considered (1) whether
the deed conveyed a strip of land, and did not contain additional lan-
guage relating to the use and purpose of the land, or in other ways lim-
iting its use; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited
its use to a specific purpose; (3) whether the deed conveyed a right of
way over a tract of land, rather than the strip itself; (4) whether the
deed was granted solely to operate and maintain a railroad; (5) whether
the deed contained a clause providing a reversionary interest to the
grantor if the railroad ceased operations; (6) whether the deed ex-
pressed substantial or nominal consideration; and (7) whether the con-
veyance contained a habendum clause, or other considerations sug-
gested by the language of the particular deed.'
In considering the seven factors, the Brown court paid particular
attention to the words "right of way" contained in railroad deeds. The
court previously noted in Roeder Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.1 2
that the deed in question conveyed "for all railroad and other right of
way purposes, certain tracts and parcels of land" and recognized a rail-
144. Id. at 738, 844 P.2dat 1011.
145. Id.; see also Veach v. Culp, 92 Wash. 2d 570, 573, 599 P.2d 526, 527 (1979).
146. Harris, 120 Wash.2d at 739, 844 P.2d at 1012; see also Zorbrist v. Culp, 95 Wash. 2d
556, 560, 627 P.2d 1308, 1310 (1981).
147. Harris, 120 Wash.2d at 739, 844 P.2d at 1012.
148. Id.
149. Brown v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 430, 435, 924 P.2d 908, 910-11 (1996).
150. Id. at 438, 924 P.2d at 912.
151. Id.; see also Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wash. 2d 533, 535-36, 225 P.2d 199, 200 (1950).
152. 105 Wash. 2d 567, 716 P.2d 855 (1986).
2001]
Seattle University Law Review
road can hold rights-of-way in fee simple or as easements.153 The
Roeder court concluded the deed in question conveyed an easement
because the document conveyed a right of way grant for railroad pur-
poses, and there was no persuasive evidence of intent to the con-
trary."l 4 The holding in Roeder was consistent with a line of railroad
right of way cases dating back to 1894.'
The holding was also immediately distinguishable from Presault.
While both the Presault and Roeder courts concluded the deeds in
question conveyed easements, the Roeder court concluded Washing-
ton law allowed railroads to hold right of ways in fee simple. In
Brown, one deed in question stated in part:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That Geo. D.
Brown and Annie L. Brown his Wife of Spokane County, State
of Washington for and in consideration of Ten & 00/100 Dol-
lars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby ac-
knowledge, do hereby convey, and Warrant unto the
CHICACO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY
COMPANY OF WASHINGTON, its successors and assigns,
a strip of land, one hundred feet in width ....
HEREBY CONVEYING a strip, belt or piece of land fifty
feet in width on each side of the center line of the Railway of
said Company, as now located and established over and across
said land. Also conveying the following extra widths for excava-
tions, embankments, depositing waste earth, and borrowing pits,
as follows: Two strip[s] of land each fifty (50) feet in width and
bordering one side of the strip of land .... And said Grantors,
for the consideration aforesaid, for themselves and for their
heirs, assigns and legal representative, further grant to said
Company, its successors and assigns, the right to protect any
cuts which may be made on said land, by erecting on both sides
153. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 438-39, 924 P.2d at 912 (citing Roeder, 105 Wash. 2d at 569,
716 P.2d at 859).
154. Roeder, 105 Wash. 2d at 572, 716 P.2d at 859.
155. Id. at 573, 716 P.2d at 859; see also King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wash. App.
888, 890, 801 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1990) (holding that a deed stating that "grant and convey.., a
right-of-way... To Have and to Hold... so long as said land is used as a right-of-way" grants
easement); Swan, 37 Wash. 2d at 534, 225 P.2d at 199 (granting property "for the purpose of a
Railroad right-of-way"); Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 564, 278 P. 686, 687
(1929) (involving a deed granting "the right-of-way for the construction of said company's rail-
road in and over"); Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 50 Wash. 502,
505, 111 P. 578, 579 (1910) (holding that a deed providing "to have and to hold said prem-
ises ... for railway purposes, but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall
revert to said grantors" grants easement, not determinable fee); Reichenbach v. Washington
Short Line Ry. Co., 10 Wash. 357, 360, 38 P. 1126, 1127 (1894) (construing the term "so long as
the same shall be used for the operation of a railroad" as granting easement).
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thereof, and within one hundred and fifty feet from said center
line, portable snow fences....
HEREBY GRANTING AND CONVEYING to said Com-
pany, its successors and assigns, a fee simple title to said strip of
land, together with all rights, priviieges and immunities that
might be acquired by the exercise of the right of eminent do-
main.i5 6
The Brown court found no language in the deed limiting the pur-
pose of the conveyed property. The court further concluded there was
no question that the railroad acquired the property through federal
statute for railroad purposes." 7 Lastly, the court concluded the deed
conveyed a defined strip of land.15
Landowners, in contending the deed conveyed an easement,
made the following three arguments: (1) eminent domain language in
the deed authorized railroads to acquire only interests necessary for
railroad operations;"5 9 (2) the "over and across" language found in the
deed's description portion is consistent with an easement; 160 and (3)
the deeds were negotiated under threat of condemnation, and property
owners therefore did not intend to convey more than what the railroad
could acquire through eminent domain, or in other words, an ease-
ment. 6
The court rejected the eminent domain argument and considered
state law at the time of the conveyance authorizing railroads to acquire
"legal title" to land or interests necessary for the operation of a rail-
way. 62 While the court acknowledged the dissent's argument that the
Washington State Constitution and statutory law authorized railroads
to acquire only easements, 63 the court concluded the conveyances at
issue occurred prior to clarifying case law.'64 At the time of the Brown
conveyance, the court noted, condemnation statutes were unclear but
did allow cities and other entities under similarly worded condemna-
tion statues to acquire fee simple interests. 65 Thus, property owners
could have intended to convey to the railroads a fee simple interest at
156. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 434-35, 924 P.2d at 910-11.
157. Id. at 440, 924 P.2d at 913.
158. Id. at 443, 924 P.2d at 915.
159. Id. at 440, 924 P.2d at 913.
160. Id. at 442, 924 P.2d at 914.
161. Id. at 442-43, 924 P.2d at 915.
162. Id. at 440, 924 P.2d at 913.
163. Id. at 460, 924 P.2d at 923 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 441, 924 P.2d at 913-14; see also Seattle Land & Improvement Co. v. City of
Seattle, 37 Wash. 274, 278, 79 P. 780, 781 (1905) (involving a situation where Seattle acquired
fee simple interest by condemnation).
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the time of the conveyance. In addition, the court interpreted the
phrase "together with all rights, privileges and immunities that might
be acquired by the exercise of the right of eminent domain" to imply a
grant of additional rights, rather than a limitation on the interest con-
veyed.166 In rejecting the landowner's eminent domain argument, the
court also rejected a second underpinning of the Federal Circuit's
holding in Preseault III that a railroad could not acquire more than
what it needed through eminent domain.
In addition to the eminent domain argument, adjacent landown-
ers argued that references to "rights of way" contained within the deed
indicated an easement, rather than fee simple title.167 In response, the
court noted the term "right of way" can have two meanings under
Washington case law. First, "right of way" can qualify or limit the in-
terest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an
easement), or, second, it can describe the strip of land being conveyed
to a railroad for constructing a railway.'68 The Washington court is
consistent with other state courts in considering dual meanings of"right of way."' 6 9 In Brown, the court found the term "right of way"
inconclusive, as a railroad can own a right of way in fee simple if so
conveyed. 7 '
The court also rejected the property owners' "over and across"
argument, concluding the deed language was ambiguous. While
property owners argued the language was consistent with granting an
easement across fee simple property, the court held it was equally pos-
sible the parties used the term "over and across" to simply locate the
corridor."7 The court further concluded the ten dollar payment for
the conveyance was similar to other such deeds at the time and incon-
clusive as to whether the railroad acquired a fee simple estate or an
easement.172
Finally, the Brown court rejected the notion that the railroad's
quasi-governmental authority coerced property owners under threat of
condemnation into conveying a greater estate than intended. The
court noted that even if railroads could only acquire easements at the
time of conveyance, many property owners welcomed the economic
benefits of railroads and willingly sold property hoping to encourage
166. Brown, 130 Wash.2d at 441, 924 P.2d at 914.
167. Id.
168. Id.; see also Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 568, 278 P. 686, 688
(1929); Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc., 120 Wash. 2d 727, 737, 844 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1993).
169. City of Manhattan Beach v. Super. Ct., 914 P.2d 160, 166 (Cal. 1996); Sowers v. Illi-
nois Central Gulf R. Co., 503 N.E. 2d 1082, 1088 (1987).
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rail activity in the area.17a The court cited case law indicating that rail-
road construction was, at times, a highly favored enterprise.174 Thus,
the court concluded the landowner's suggestion of coercion by the rail-
road was inconclusive at best.17
In ruling for the State, the court concluded the deeds in question
fell squarely within the rule that the conveyance shall be construed as
fee simple title absent any language limiting either the purpose of the
grant or the estate conveyed as pertaining to a definite strip of land.'76
C. Federal Easements and Land Grants
A second issue in Brown involved railroad titles conveyed under
the General Railroad Right of Way Act of 1875.177 The Act, now
codified at 43 U.S.C. § 912,178 was drafted following a change in fed-
eral policy regarding the nation's railroads. In 1850, Congress began
subsidizing railroad construction through lavish public land grants.1 79
Some of the grants involved millions of acres from the public do-
main." The public disfavored the policy, leading the House of Rep-
173. Id. at 443-44, 924 P.2d at 915; see also Ira A. Nadeau, Railroad Situation in Washing-
ton, WASH. MAG., Apr. 1906, at 2 ("The coming of the railroads made the settlement of the
greater portion of our state possible.").
174. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 443, 924 P.2d at 915 (citing State Rd. Comm'n v. Johnson,
161 A.2d 444 (Md. 1960)).
175. Id. at 442-43, 924 P.2d at 915.
176. Id. at 443, 924 P.2d at 915; see also Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wash. 2d 533, 536, 225 P.2d
199, 200 (1950).
177. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 444, 924 P.2d at 916.
178. § 912 provides, in part:
Whenever public lands of the United States have been or may be granted to any rail-
road company for use as a right of way for its railroad... and use and occupancy of
said lands for such purposes has ceased or shall hereafter cease.., by abandonment
by said railroad company declared or decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction or
by Act of Congress, then and thereupon all right, title, interest, and estate of the
United States in said lands shall, except such part thereof as may be embraced in a
public highway legally established within one year after the date of said decree or for-
feiture or abandonment be transferred to and vested in any person, firm, or corpora-
tion, assigns, or successors in title and interest to whom or to which title of the United
States may have been or may be granted, conveying or purporting to convey the whole
of the legal subdivision or subdivisions traversed or occupied by such railroad ... ex-
pect lands within a municipality the title to which, up forfeiture or abandonment...
shall vest in such municipality ... Provided, That this section shall not affect convey-
ances made by any railroad company of portions of its right of way if such convey-
ances be among those which... may... before such forfeiture or abandonment be
validated and confirmed by any such Act of Congress.
179. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 273 (1942).
180. Id. at 273 n.6 (citing the Northern Pacific Grant Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 365, as
the largest grant involving an estimated forty million acres).
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resentatives Resolution to end outright grants for railroads.18' Never-
theless, Congress still encouraged the railroads to lay tracks to develop
the West.' Subsequent acts of Congress, however, generally inferred
the conveyance of an easement to railroads.'83 While these subsequent
acts did not expressly call the conveyances easements, the language
generally granted railroads rights of way through the United States
public land.'84 Congress passed at least fifteen such conveyances be-
tween 1871 and 1875, all granting railroads "right of way" through
public lands.'85
The numerous pieces of special legislation prompted lawmakers
to adopt a general right of way statute.'86 The Court subsequently
concluded the Act granted railroads an easement, rather than a fee.' 87
Congress expressly noted as such in subsequent legislation.'88 For ex-
ample, lawmakers declared that, upon a forfeiture of unused rights of
way, "the United States ... resumes the full title to the lands covered
thereby [by the right of way] freed and discharged from such ease-
ment."' 89
The Washington State Supreme Court in Brown considered
whether the easement subsequently reverted to the abutting property
owner. 9 ° The court held it did not' and recognized that Congress
intended under 43 U.S.C. § 912 that the purchaser of the right of way,
rather than the owner of the abutting property, expressly retained a
reversionary interest in the right of way.'92 The court further recog-
nized that Congress partially divested the government's reversionary
interest by granting reversionary interest to owner of the legal subdivi-
181. Id. at 273-74 ("Resolved, That in the judgment of this House the policy of granting
subsidies in public lands to railroads and other corporations ought to be discontinued, and that
every consideration of public policy and equal justice to the whole people requires that the public
lands should be held for the purpose of securing homesteads to actual settlers, and for educa-
tional purposes, as may be provided by law.") (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1585
(1872)).
182. Id. at 274.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 274 n.10 (noting that, in reporting a bill granting a right of way to the Dakota
Grand Trunk Railway, the committee chair said, "This is merely a grant of "right of way") (cit-
ing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 2d Sess., 3913 (1872)).
185. Id. at 274 n.9.
186. Id at 275.
187. Id. at 275 n.13.
188. Id. at 276.
189. Id. (noting that the language is repeated in the Forfeiture Act of February 25, 1909,
ch. 191, 35 Stat. 647, and passed on June 26, 1906 in an act confirming "the rights of way which
certain railroads had acquired under the 1875 Act in the Territories of Oklahoma and Arizona").
190. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 445, 924 P.2d at 916.




sion previously traversed by the right of way."' The Washington
court considered a local municipality's reversionary interest in federal
railroad grants in City of Buckley v. Burlington Northern Railroad
Corp."9 4 The case was one of first impression in the country.19
The purpose of § 912 is the disposition of the federal govern-
ment's reversionary interest in rights of way granted pursuant to fed-
eral railroad land grants.'96 The dispute in City of Buckley was
whether federally granted rail rights of way reverted to the underlying
incorporated municipality or to the railroad operator. 9 The court fo-
cused its reasoning around the Congressional intent of § 912, specifi-
cally recognizing later drafts of the enabling legislation and the mu-
nicipal reversion provision.'98 The court's reasoning was further
supported by federal district court dicta noting a municipal reversion-
ary exception in separate but similar federal statutes addressing rail-
road rights of way.'99 In other words, the City of Buckley court noted
that through § 912, Congress recognized a public value or interest in
maintaining railroad right of ways even after railroad use had ceased.
The court deciding Brown ten years later similarly upheld the
possibility of alternate public uses for unused railroad corridors by
ruling against adjacent property owners claiming a reversionary inter-
est in the right of way.200 Property owners claimed the interest as
rightful owners in the "legal subdivision previously traversed by the
railroad" as provided for in § 912.21 Abutting owners argued that the
State purchased the right of way for a recreational trail following a
(railroad) reorganization court order for rail abandonment, and there-
fore, reversion to the underlying servient estate had already oc-
curred.2  Conversely, the State argued it purchased the underlying
property prior to any abandonment proceedings "validated and con-
193. Id. at 445, 924 P.2d at 916 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 912).
194. 106 Wash. 2d 581, 723 P.2d 434 (1986).
195. Id. at 583, 723 P.2d at 435.
196. Id. at 583, 723 P.2d at 436.
197. Id. at 581-82, 723 P.2d at 435.
198. Id. at 584-85, 723 P.2d at 436 (noting that amended versions of House and Senate
bills prior to final passage in 1922, now codified as 43 U.S.C. § 912, added the municipal excep-
tion to railway corridor reversions).
199. Id. at 587 n.2, 723 P.2d at 437 n.2 ("Viewing the narrow strips as of little or no use or
value to the Government, Congress passed Section 912 providing that the abandoned right of
way vested in the person or entity owning the land traversed by the railroad line, except when the
right of way was within a municipality, in which case it then vested in the municipality.") (em-
phasis added).
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firmed by any Act of Congress," and therefore, the State held title to
any reversionary interest. 23 The court agreed with the State.
The majority in Brown concluded in order for reversionary inter-
ests to vest under § 912, the railroad must first cease "use and occu-
pancy" of the rights of way and a court of competent jurisdiction or a
Congressional act must next "declare or decreed" abandonment. 204
The Brown court noted that the reorganization court had authorized
abandonment of the right of way prior to the trustee selling the corri-
dor to the state.205 The court recognized, however, that the reorgani-
zation court also directed the trustee "to fully pursue all possibilities
for sale of portions of these lines for continued rail operation or other
public use before he disturbs any tracks of facilities west of Miles City,
Montana... "206 The "'use and occupancy' of the right of way had
apparently ceased" before the right of way sale to the State.20 7 Never-
theless, "authorizing conditional abandonment and declaring a railway
abandoned are two separate acts. "208 In this particular case, "no court
of competent jurisdiction has declared or decreed the railway aban-
doned even though abandonment has been authorized. "209 In addi-
tion, the Brown court concluded that since federal "easements" on
public land are granted by Congress, the easements are subject to
Congressional desires rather than common law. 210 Lastly, as Congress
authorized the sale of the right of way for non-railroad purposes, the
court concluded, "Congress intended the reversionary interest to vest
in the purchaser of the right of way rather than the owner of the abut-
'211ting property.
The court's holding in Brown, while perhaps controversial, is a
significant moment in the rail-to-trails issue in Washington State.
The court had established specific factors to be used when determin-
ing whether a railroad deed conveyed a fee interest or an easement.212
The court also recognized the public value Congress has placed in un-
used railroad corridors across the country. In addition to providing a
203. Id. at 446, 924 P.2d at 916.
204. Id. at 447, 924 P.2d at 917 (citing Vieux v. E. Bay Reg'I Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330,
1337 (9th Cir. 1990); Idaho v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 617 F. Supp. 207, 216, 218 (D. Idaho
1985)).





210. Id. at 447-48, 924 P.2d at 917 (citing Idaho v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 617 F. Supp.
207, 212 (D. Idaho 1985)).
211. Id. at 448,924 P.2dat 917.
212. Id. at 438, 449, 924 P.2d at 912, 918 ((1) the deed language, (2) circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the deed, and (3) subsequent conduct of the parties).
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state or municipality with new public recreational or bicycle trails, va-
cated rail corridors can also provide valuable right of ways for water
and sewer lines, fiber optic cable, and high speed Internet connec-
tions."'
D. The Dissent
Critics of the Brown court contend the court overreached in its
analysis of what the deeds in question actually conveyed. For exam-
ple, in his dissent, Justice Sanders, a former property rights lawyer,214
noted the majority's acknowledgment that the deeds showed the Mil-
waukee Railroad acquired the disputed property for railroad pur-
poses. 21S Hence, he argued, the court did not need to go further in de-
termining the intent of the conveyance. 21 He also argued the court
erred in construing the deeds as conveying a fee interest, rather than
an easement based on previous court holdings interpreting ambiguous
conveyances.2 7
The dissent's arguments, however, do little to shed light on what
the grantors in question ultimately intended to convey. First, the dis-
sent relied heavily on Morsbach, which held that a grant of a right of
way for a railroad passes as only an easement. 218 He also cited to legal
scholar William B. Stoebuck who wrote, "Washington decisions in-
volving disputed language seem to favor the granting of an easement,
though they do not say so in so many words.' '219 The dissent argued
the search for a grantor's intent ends once the purpose for the convey-
ance is found °.22  The Morsbach deed, however, never mentioned the
word "fee. ' 221  The court instead focused on the phrase "right of
213. See Wright & Hester, supra note 32.
214. David Postman, Supreme Court Justice Isn't Afraid to be Different, SEATTLE TIMES
(Sept. 3, 1998), available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/c/s.dll/texis/web
/vortex/display?slug=sand&date=19980903.
215. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 449, 924 P.2d at 918 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
216. Id.
217. See id. at 450-61, 924 P.2d at 919-25 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 451, 924 P.2d at 919 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
219. 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY
LAW§ 7.9, at 462, 464 (1995).
220. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 451, 924 P.2d at 919 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
221. Morsbach, 152 Wash. 562 at 564-65, 278 P. at 687. The deed said:
Know all men by these presents, that Edward Kratz of Thurston county, Washing-
ton territory, in consideration of two hundred dollars ($200) paid by the Northern Pa-
cific Railroad Company and other good and valuable considerations, the receipt
whereof is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents give, grant, bargain, sell and
convey unto said Northern Pacific Company, or its assigns the following described
premises, viz: the right of way for the construction of said company's railroad in and
over the south half of the northeast quarter of section twenty-two and the west half of
the northwest quarter of section twenty-three of township fifteen north of range two
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way. '  In interpreting the Morsbach deed, the court looked to case
law and noted, "[T]he construction of a deed must be made upon the
entire instrument, and the intention of the grantor, as derived from the
deed itself should be sought."223 The court examined the entire deed
and noted that the deed expressly conveyed land "for the construction
of said company's railroad." '224 The court further noted that the docu-
ment did not contain a reverter clause, or a clause reserving the right
of re-entry in the event the railroad abandoned the property, possibly
indicating a fee interest.22 Nevertheless, the court concluded the use
of the term "right of way" does not reflect an intention to convey a fee
simple interest, but reflects a grant of an easement. 226 Thus, the court
looked to the intent of the parties as manifested on the deed in ques-
tion, rather than making a conclusion after finding the deed's pur-
pose.227
While there is no question the grantors in Brown intended to
convey land for railroad purposes, the deed did not limit the grant to
such purpose. The deed also expressly attempted to convey a fee sim-
ple interest.228 In Washington, a railroad can hold a fee interest in
land used for railroad purposes.229 The court has long held that when
parts of a deed seem inconsistent, the court will try to harmonize them
west, situate in Thurston county, Washington territory, and the construction of cer-
tain canals, whereby the channel of Skookumchuck is changed and prevented from in-
fringing upon said railroad including the land necessary for said roads and canals,
hereby acknowledging satisfaction in full for all damages therefrom.
To have and to hold the general premises with the privileges and appurtenances
thereto belonging to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company its successors and as-
signs to their use and behoof forever. And the said Edward Kratz for himself and his
heirs, executors and administrators does covenant with said Northern Pacific Railroad
Company its successors and assigns that he is lawfully seized of the aforesaid prem-
ises, and that they are free from all incumbrances, that he has good right to sell and
convey same to said Northern Pacific Railroad Company as aforesaid and that he will
and his heirs, executors, and administrators will warrant and defend the same to the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company its successors and assigns forever against the law-
ful claims and demands of all persons.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 12th day of Novem-
ber in the year of our Lord Eighteen Hundred and Seventy-two.
Id.
222. Id. at 568, 278 P. at 688 ("It will be observed that the granting clause creates a right of
way without any specific width or length .. .
223. Id. at 571, 278 P. at 689.
224. Id. at 564, 278 P. at 687.
225. Id. at 567, 289 P. at 688.
226. Id. at 574-75, 278 P. at 690.
227. Id. at 575, 278 P. at 690.
228. Brown v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 430, 435, 924 P.2d 908, 911 (1996).
229. See Roeder Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 105 Wash. 2d 567, 716 P.2d 855 (1986).
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so as to give them all effect.23° The rule is applicable even when con-
sidering railroad deeds. While the grantors in Brown intended to con-
vey the property for railroad use, there is no evidence limiting the
conveyance to rail use. If the grantors intended to convey a fee simple
interest, merely concluding they did not is a factual determination in-
consistent with the deed. Furthermore, looking outside the four cor-
ners of an ambiguous railroad deed to determine whether the docu-
ment conveyed a fee interest or easement is also consistent with other
court decisions.23 1 While the dissent in Brown contended the deeds
conveyed land for railroad purposes only, and therefore conveyed only
an easement, the documents are far from clear on the matter. Merely
stating a purpose does little to shed light on the grantor's intent.
Secondly, the dissent contended the nominal consideration of ten
dollars is more consistent with the lesser estate of an easement, rather
than the greater fee estate.232 However, courts around the country
have concluded the consideration paid may evince a party's intent but
is not dispositive in determining the interest conveyed. A Nebraska
appellate court has held that consideration as low as one dollar did not
changed the nature of a fee conveyance.2 33  An Arkansas court has
concluded benefits from the building of a railroad did not create an
ambiguity in a deed conveying a fee simple interest as such considera-
tion could have been valuable.2 34 A Florida appellate court has held
that sufficiency of consideration is not a relevant basis upon which to
void a deed.235 While the dissent may conclude the nominal consid-
eration in Brown is indicative of an easement, the evidence suggests
otherwise.
Lastly, the dissent argued the "eminent domain" language in-
cluded in Brown implies that the land was acquired through condem-
nation.3 6 The dissent may have a point, although the majority con-
strued the eminent domain reference as granting additional rights,
rather than limiting rights.237 Whether the land was acquired through
230. STOEBUCK, supra note 219 (citing Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351, 98 P. 756
(1909)).
231. See City of Manhattan Beach v. Super. Ct., 914 P.2d 160, 169 (Cal. 1996) (holding
that words "right of way" was ambiguous and admitting extrinsic evidence); see also STOEBUCK,
supra note 219 (citing Moore v. Gillingham, 22 Wash. 2d 655, 157 P.2d 598 (1945)).
232. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 458, 924 P.2d 923.
233. Elton Schmidt & Sons Farm Co. v. Kneib, 507 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Neb. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that nominal monetary consideration alone does not make the instrument am-
biguous nor create an easement).
234. Coleman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 745 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ark. 1988).
235. Kingsland v. Godbold, 456 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. App. 1984), see also Hunter v. Mil-
hous, 305 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973).
236. Brown, 130 Wash. 2d at 459, 924 P.2d at 923.
237. Id. at 441, 924 P.2d at 914.
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eminent domain proceedings is not clear. Whether the grant of fee
simple title conveyed a fee simple absolute or a fee simple determin-
able interest is also ambiguous. The dissent correctly argues the term
fee simple may connote a determinable fee, more akin to an easement.
The deed in question, however, does not mention a right of re-entry or
possibility of reverter, indicating that the deed may convey a fee sim-
ple absolute. While the dissent does raise valid points with regards to
deed language, his arguments do little to clarify what was contem-
plated at the time of conveyance.
E. Other "Brown" Cases
Whether Brown changed, or merely refined, Washington law
pertaining to railroad deed interpretation is subject to debate. Of
more importance is how state and federal courts have incorporated the
Brown analysis into subsequent case holdings. Four years after Brown,
the Washington State Court of Appeals heard Roeder Co. v. K & E
Moving & Storage Co. Inc.238 The case involved a 1901 conveyance of
a fifty-foot wide strip of land for a railroad right of way.23 9 The issue
was whether the deed conveyed a fee interest or an easement. 240 The
matter came up again one year later in federal court, in King County v.
Rasmussen.24 1 At issue in Rasmussen was a deed granting a 100-foot
wide railroad right of way (fifty feet either side of centerline), allowing
the railroad to clear trees hazardous to rail operations up to 200 feet
from centerline. 242 As in Roeder, the issue involved whether the rail-
road received a fee simple interest in the corridor or an easement. In
both cases, the courts found the deeds ambiguous on their face with no
limiting language and considered extrinsic evidence in resolving the
ambiguities. More significantly, the courts in both Roeder and Ras-
mussen applied the procedures adopted in Brown to reach the conclu-
sion that the deeds in question conveyed a fee simple interest, rather
than an easement. The Rasmussen court derived a three-step analysis
from Brown and considered: (1) the language of the deed, (2) subse-
quent behavior of the parties regarding the use of the land in question,
and (3) circumstances at the time of execution of the deed.244 In both
cases, the court quieted title in favor of local municipalities looking to
use the unused railroad corridors for public purposes. In Rasmussen,
238. 102 Wash. App. 49, 4 P.3d 839 (2000).
239. Id. at 51, 4 P.3d at 840.
240. Id. at 52, 4 P.3d at 840.
241. 143 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
242. Id. at 1226.
243. Id. at 1228.
244. Id. at 1229.
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the court found the legal issue settled and dismissed the Rasmussen's
claim to the adjacent railroad property on summary judgment.245
The Washington court is not unique in construing railroad deeds
without limiting language to convey a fee simple absolute interest. An
Indiana appellate court addressed the issue in Clark v. CSX Transpor-
tation, Inc. 246 The court examined numerous rail conveyances in a
class action suit brought by residents opposing a recreational trail.
247
The court found no limiting language in all but one of the deeds in-
cluded in a subclass and held that the deeds conveyed a fee simple ab-
solute interest.248 When a deed in question included the limiting
clause, "so long as the railroad continues to operate service," the court
held the deed conveyed an easement.2 49 The Indiana court relied on
similar principles of deed construction as the Washington court used
in Brown.2"° The Indiana court stated the object of deed construction
is to ascertain the intent of the parties from the language of the deed.25'
In construing a deed, the court should consider the entire deed so no
part is rejected.2"2 If an ambiguity exists, the court may look to parole
evidence to explain the instrument, not to contradict it.
253
The Illinois State Supreme Court concluded likewise in Urbaitis
v. Commonwealth Edison.2"4 The case also involved a recreational trail.
Adjacent homeowners argued the railroad was granted an easement.2 5
The railroad argued it was granted fee simple title. 26 The court held
for the railroad, concluding the deeds conveyed a fee simple interest.25 7
The court noted that where a deed conveys a definite parcel of land
without limiting language, the deed grants a fee simple estate.255 In
holding for the railroad, the court expressly rejected the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that the term "right of way" conveys an easement. 25 9 The
court wrote, "[T]here is no per se rule that the mere inclusion of the
term 'right of way' in any deed to a railroad negates the possibility that
245. Id. at 1232.
246. 737 N.E.2d 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
247. Id. at 755.
248. Id. at 760-64.
249. Id. at 763.
250. Id. at 757-58.
251. Id. at 757.
252 Id.
253. Id. at 758.
254. 575 N.E.2d 548 (I1. 1991).
255. Id. at 462.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 555.
258. Id. at 552.
259. Id. at 553.
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title in fee simple was conveyed.""26 The court concluded such a rule
would allow form to predominate over substance, and would frustrate
the otherwise demonstrated intent of the parties.26' Lastly, the court
concluded even use of the term "right of way" did not embrace such a
per se rule even when grantors intended to convey an easement. 262
IV. THE IMPACT OF BROWN AND ITS PROGENY
The Washington court's adoption of Brown was a positive step in
the ongoing controversy over recreational trails for three reasons.
First, the holding and subsequent application of the court's reasoning
clarifies many of the acquisition issues which arise when planning a
new trail. Such clarity is welcome as trail opponents and adjacent
property owners often attempt to obfuscate legal issues for public rela-
tions reasons when opposing trail development. Second, the holding
and reasoning in Brown allows municipalities to fulfill Congressional
intent to maintain valuable public corridors and to pursue local public
land use policy goals. Lastly, Brown and its progeny make recreational
trail construction and railway corridor preservation more appropriately
a legislative or political issue, rather than a legal matter.
The real opposition to recreational trails is no better demon-
strated than in King County v. Rasmussen263 where the defendants
claimed that, in addition to property rights violations, the construction
of a public recreational trail adjacent to their home violated their First,
Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights under the U.S.




263. 143 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
264. Id. at 1227. The Rasmussens also charged King County with violating Article I, § 16
of the Washington State Constitution:
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of neces-
sity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural,
domestic, or sanitary purposes. No private property shall be taken or damaged for
public or private use without just compensation having been first made, or paid into
court for the owner, and no right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corpo-
ration other than municipal until full compensation therefore be first made in money,
or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit from any
improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be ascertained
by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in courts of record, in the
manner prescribed by law. Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for
a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public
shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative
assertion that the use is public: Provided, That the taking of private property by the




tional trail on a former rail bed violated their civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and, lastly, challenged the STB's handling of rail aban-
donment proceedings. 2 ' The court dismissed the defendant's civil
rights and constitutional claims as having no merit, and dismissed
STB abandonment challenge as outside the jurisdiction of federal dis-
266trict court.
Such legal challenges, which have little to do with property
rights, nevertheless have increased the public costs of trail projects for
taxpayers and have delayed construction of some trails for years.267
Incorporating Brown and establishing procedures for utilizing extrinsic
evidence in determining the intent of a conveyance will help provide
municipalities with more certainty when planning future railroad cor-
ridor acquisitions. Greater certainty would also provide prospective
homeowners with greater knowledge and notice when deciding to pur-
chase lots adjacent to inactive rail corridors. 26' Reducing uncertainty
as to future land interests of all parties will help reduce litigation ex-
penses and avoid costly delays in trail planning.
Second, Congress has long recognized the value of the country's
investment in a nationwide transportation network through the en-
actment of § 912 and other statutory provisions such as the National
Trail System Act. Critics of corridor preservation argue the likelihood
of reactivation of an abandoned rail corridor is remote.269 Railbanking
opponents further contend the true purpose of policymakers in enact-
ing the railbanking statute was less to prevent the abandonment of rail
lines and more to promote the creation of recreational trails. 27° Never-
theless, even though the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
in Presault II that preserving rail corridors for future train use could be
tenuous,27' preserved rail corridors have reverted to rail use in parts of
the country.272 In addition, the policy of preserving rail corridors for
Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1231-32. The civil rights claim, along with claims of Constitutional violations
were brought as counterclaims in a quiet title action. Id. The court summarily dismissed the
counterclaims as the defendants failed to show unconstitutional behavior on the part of the
County, or so any unconstitutional conduct resulting from official policy, practice, or custom.
Id.
267. Id. at 1226. Burlington Northern sold the railroad corridor in 1997. Id.
268. Arguably, a twenty-foot wide corridor through a property should provide a prospec-
tive homeowner with sufficient notice of the potential for alternate public uses.
269. See Drumm, supra note 28.
270. Id.
271. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
272. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE SAM
BROWNBACK, U.S. SENATE, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, "ISSUES RELATED TO
PRESERVING INACTIVE RAIL LINES AS TRAILS" (Oct. 1999).
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future rail use was never predicated on the certainty that rail service
would return to a corridor, but only on the premise that the rail or
transportation services could return to a corridor.273 Indeed, one sub-
urban city in Washington State has actively considered reestablishing
an inactive rail line for economic development and transportation pur-poses.274 More importantly, Congress has embarked on preserving rail
corridors as a matter of public policy because once these assets are lost,
reestablishment would lead to prohibitive costs for railroads or public
entities and disruptive and potentially expensive condemnation pro-
ceedings involving private landowners. Allowing a court to consider
railroad deeds as possibly conveying a fee interest or allowing federal
railroad easements to revert to the underlying city, state, or public
landholder would provide local municipalities the option to preserve
needed corridors for local public uses.
Lastly, if acquiring unused rail corridors does not constitute an
unconstitutional taking as a matter of law, the issue of creating a rec-
reational trail becomes a legislative or political question, rather than a
judicial one. Placing the recreational trail issue in the hands of the leg-
islative or executive branch of government is appropriate, as the con-
troversy over recreational trails has rarely been about property rights,
compensation, or whether a corridor is held in fee or as an easement.
The opposition to trails have generally centered on landowner's objec-
tions to a public park, albeit a linear one, adjacent to homes, or
through farmland.27 Recreational trail critics, usually adjacent prop-
erty owners, traditionally cite nuisances such as additional trail noise
and loss of privacy as placing increased burdens on the property.276
Landowners also cite reports characterizing trespassing trail users as
presenting significant security problems or nuisance.277 The Federal
Circuit paid homage to such objections in Presault III. The court con-
cluded:
[N]oisy though they may be [trains] are limited in location, in
number, and in frequency of occurrence .... When used for
public recreational purposes, however .... the burden imposed
273. Preseault II, 494 U.S. at 19 ("Congress apparently believed that every line is a poten-
tially valuable asset that merits preservation even if no future rail use for it is currently foresee-
able.").
274. Mike Lindblom, Trolley May Soon Troll in Issaquah, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 5, 2000,
available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/c/s.dll/texis/web/vortex/display?slug=
rail05m&date=20000905.
275. Mike Lewis, A Trail of Fears Pits Rich Against Public: County to vote on opening path
that divides estates and provokes hostility, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 6, 2000, avail-
able at http://seattlep-i.nwsource.com/local/samm06.shtml.
276. See Drumm, supra note 28, at 165.
277. Id. (citing Whitely, Study Shows Benefits, supra note 20).
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by the use of the easement is at the whim of the many individu-
als, and ... has been impossible to contain in numbers or to
keep strictly within the parameters of the easement.
278
Railbanking critics further contend the reduced privacy and in-
creased likelihood of trespassing lowers property values adjacent to the
corridor. Critics say property values near, but not adjacent to, Seat-
tle's popular Burke-Gilman trail experienced anywhere from a 72.9 to
113.78 percent increase in value between 1979 and 1988.279 Homes
next to Burke-Gilman, on the other hand, appreciated only 26.62 per-
cent during the same time period.2"' Railbanking critics contend the
gap in appreciation rates illustrates the undesirability of living next to
a recreational trail, as opposed to the desirability of having a trail in
the neighborhood. They also cite dramatic increases in crime, includ-
ing three homicides during the history of the Burke-Gilman itself.
2 l8
Such arguments are inconclusive at best and imaginative at
worst. For example, studies between 1979 and 1997 showed that van-
dalism and break-in incidents along the Burke-Gilman were well be-
low the neighborhood average. 212 Anecdotal reports from local law en-
forcement officers have also noted that trails in their respective
municipalities have "not caused any increase in the amount of crimes
reported 28 3 and "probably [deter] crime since there are so many peo-
ple, tourists and local citizens using the trail. '28 4 A 1995 annual sur-
vey of thirty-six urban trails covering 332 miles with an estimated five
million users reported substantially low rate of assault, rape, and mur-
der on public recreational trails as compared to national averages.
28 5
The study showed that while the national rate of urban assaults was
531 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants, there were only three urban
278. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
279. Welsh, supra note 23.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Tammy Tracy & Hugh Morris, Rails-Trails and Safe Communities, The Experience on
372 Trails, in RAILS-TO-TRAILS CONSERVANCY 2 (Jan. 1998) (citing SEATTLE ENG'G DEP'T &
OFFICE FOR PLANNING, EVALUATION OF THE BURKE-GILMAN TRAIL'S EFFECTS ON
PROPERTY VALUES AND CRIME (May 1987)).
283. Id. at 4. The authors quoted Charles R. Tennant, Chief of Police, Elizabeth Town-
ship, Buena Vista, PA, who said:
The trail has not caused any increase in the amount of crimes reported and the few
reported incidents are minor in nature .... We have found that the trail brings in so
many people that it has actually led to a decrease in problems we formerly encoun-
tered such as underage drinking along the river banks. The increased presence of
people on the trail has contributed to this problem being reduced.
284. Id. (quoting Pat Conlin, Sheriff, Green County, WI, who said, "The trail does not
encourage crime, and in fact, probably deters crime since there are many people, tourists and
local citizens using the trail for many activities at various hours of the day").
285. Id. at 5 (comparing FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 1995 with RTC survey results).
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rails-trails assaults reported in 1995 and 1996.286 The study further
showed that while the national rate of burglaries in urban areas was
1,117 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants, there were no reports of bur-
glary from homeowners living adjacent to a recreational trail in
1996.287 The figures were similar for both suburban2.. and rural
trails. 29 Suburban trails reported one break-in to an adjacent property
in 1996, as compared to a national burglary rate of 820 incidents per
100,000 inhabitants. 29" Rural trails reported three break-ins in both
1995 and 1996, when compared to a national burglary rate of 687 inci-
dents per 100,000 inhabitants. 291
With regard to property values, a study comparing similarly val-
ued property on and off the Burke-Gilman showed property bordering
the trail selling for six percent more than other comparably sized
houses.292 Another study reported that a developer, who donated a
fifty-foot-wide and seven-mile-long easement along a popular trail,
sold all fifty parcels bordering the trail in four months. 293  Further-
more, there is no evidence that the prospect of converting a railbed
into a recreational trail curtails home construction and sales adjacent
to the corridor.294 In addition, other studies concluded trails can add
significant amounts of annual revenue to local communities. 2  After
years of testimony in an extremely controversial rails-to-trails case, the
286. Id. at 8 (noting that only five percent of urban rails-trails reported trespassing, twenty-
six percent reported graffiti, twenty-four percent reported littering, twenty-two percent reported
sign damage, and eighteen percent reported unauthorized motorized usage).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 9 (noting that three percent of suburban trails reported trespassing, seventeen
percent reported graffiti, twenty-four percent reported littering, twenty-two percent reported
sign damage, and fourteen percent reported unauthorized motorized usage).
289. Id. (noting that four percent of rural trails reported trespassing, twelve percent re-
ported graffiti, twenty-five percent reported littering, twenty-three percent reported sign dam-
age, and twenty-three percent reported unauthorized motor usage).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. STEVE LERNER & WILLIAM POOLE, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PARKS AND
OPEN SPACE (Trust for Pub. Land 1999) available at http://www.tpl.org/tier3_cdl.
cfm?contentitemid=1145&folderid=727 (citing Elizabeth Brabec, On the Value of Open
Space, Scenic America, Technical Information Series (vol. 1, no. 2 1992)).
293. Id. (citing NAT'L PARK SERV., RIVERS TRAILS AND CONSERVATION ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PROTECTING RIVERS, TRAILS, AND GREENWAY
CORRIDORS (4th ed. 1995)).
294. Mike Lindblom, Lakeside Trail May Be Running Up Home Sales, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 8, 2000, available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgibin/texis/web/vortex/
display? slug= prop08m&date =20000508.
295. LERNER & POOLE, supra note 292, at 13 n.64 (citing ROGER MOORE ET AL., THE
IMPACTS OF RAILS-TRAILS: A STUDY OF USER AND PROPERTY OWNERS FROM THREE
TRAILS (July 1992) (noting that the National Park Service found three trails in Iowa, Florida,




Maryland Supreme Court reached a conclusion, diametrically opposite
to the view of the federal court as expressed in Presault III. The
Maryland court concluded, "bikers and walkers, even in large groups,
simply cannot be said to be more burdensome than locomotive engines
pulling truck-sized railroad cars through the corridor. 296
Even if recreational trails somehow impose minor incremental
burdens on neighboring property owners, no one in our country is
immune from collateral impacts from public amenities. Residents liv-
ing miles away from an airport nevertheless find themselves under
noisy flight paths. Neighborhoods located near sporting venues have
experienced roads jammed with traffic on game days. Homeowners in
once outlying, rural areas may now find themselves living next to
gravel quarries, timber operations or industrial work sites needed to
support the local or regional infrastructure. Such is the nature of a
modern society. Despite their objections to recreational trails, not one
trail critic has ever volunteered to cease flying, stop driving, give up
attending sporting or public entertainment events, or swear off using
natural resources.
In Washington, state and local officials are not required by stat-
ute to preserve public rail corridors. State law, however, does ex-
pressly provide for the acquisition of open space for natural and rec-
reational areas when appropriate as a matter of public policy.297
Furthermore, Washington's 1990 Growth Management Act attempts
to encourage urban development, to reduce suburban sprawl, to pre-
serve natural resources, and to encourage efficient transportation."'
Converting railroad corridors into recreational trails furthers growth
management policy goals by providing alternate transportation oppor-
tunities299 as well as by accommodating the public desire or need for
neighborhood and community recreational facilities."°
296. Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1078 (Md. 1999), cert denied
121 S. Ct. 380 (2000).
297. WASH. REV. CODE § 79A.15.005 (2000) ("It is therefore the policy of the state to ac-
quire as soon as possible the most significant lands for wildlife conservation and outdoor recrea-
tion purposes before they are converted to other uses ... .
298. WASH REV. CODE § 84.14.010 (2000).
299. See Roger L. Moore & D. Thomas Ross, Trail and Recreational Greenways: Corridors
of Benefits, Parks & Recreation (Jan. 1, 1998) available at 1998 WL 10426775 (noting that trails
provide alternative transportation routes to work, shopping, schools, and parks state that trails
serve to protect open space and the environment).
300. Elizabeth Williams, Survey: Sammamish Wants Better Parks and Open Space,
EASTSIDE J., Aug. 31, 2000, available at http://www.eastsidejoumal.com/sited/story/html/
27909.
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V. CONCLUSION
The recreational trail issue in Washington State remains hotly
contested both in the court of law and in the court of public opinion.
Despite recent judicial holdings on the matter, the specter of a recrea-
tional trail will no doubt lead to significant litigation. Nevertheless,
the Brown, K &E Moving & Storage Co., Inc., and Rasmussen deci-
sions have helped to clarify significant legal issues pertaining to corri-
dor acquisition. The cases can serve as a guide when navigating the
often-murky waters of railroad deed conveyances and serve as a bea-
con when factual conclusions as to scope and intent are unclear. Un-
der these holdings, the courts are to consider state and federal statutes
as well as state property law pertaining to railroad land transfers and
reversions. More importantly, however, the courts will give effect to
Congressional intent and sound public policy, while maintaining the
integrity of some fundamental tenets of common law. As Washing-
ton's population continues to grow, particularly around urban centers,
public open space is becoming an increasingly rare and much sought
after amenity. In addition to providing recreational activity for the
young and old, trails provide for alternate, nonpolluting forms of
transportation. The Washington Supreme Court in the new millen-
nium has appropriately left state and local lawmakers the option to ac-
commodate such public policy goals by recognizing the value property
owners placed in rail corridors centuries ago.
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